Director of Approxy of For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP	7070075400	Top Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP	7910092 5 803	1300020001-1
The master of th		
	118	
	<i>[</i> -1,	

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

3 April 1979

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

	25> Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300020001-1	K
	National Intelligence Daily (Cable)	X´
	Contents 25)	X´
25X1	Briefs and Comments	
	Turkey: Political Assessment	
25X1		
	USSR: Industrial Production Languishes 7	
25X1		

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

TURKEY: Political Assessment

25X1

The US Embassy in Ankara believes Prime Minister 25X1 Ecevit's left-of-center government, despite its slumping popularity, has a good chance of remaining in power until the October senatorial election, barring a further breakdown in the economy or in public order.

The Embassy comments that Ecevit recently demonstrated his parliamentary strength by winning crucial budget and martial law extension votes. His troubled legislative majority seems inclined to stick together out of fear that an early election would cause the government to fall.

The major opposition Justice Party, unsuccessful so far in capitalizing on the infighting, is now preparing for the October election when one-third of the senate seats will be contested. According to the Embassy, as 25X1 long as Ecevit can keep his supporters in line, no combination of opposition parties or deputies can unseat him. Moreover, some in the Justice Party are leery of coalitions with competing conservative parties.

Many Turks, including the President, seem to favor a "national" government of moderate politicians, or a "grand coalition" of both major parties minus their present leaders, as a means of confronting the country's 25X1 problems. Past "above-parties" governments in Turkey have proven ineffective, and neither Ecevit nor Justice Party leader Demirel will readily relinquish his leadership. President Koruturk, meanwhile, seems unwilling to use pressure to produce greater party cooperation.

The Embassy believes that the military, though disinclined to become involved in politics, might intervene if the economy or public order deteriorate rapidly, or if Kurdish separatist activity resumes. At a minimum, the military might insist on a "above-parties" government or call for new elections. If compelled to take control, the military might seek to make some constitutional revisions to end the string of weak coalition governments. Such intervention would probably entail a temporary loss of some freedoms, but the Embassy believes the military would be motivated by a desire to reform, not to discard, Turkish democracy.

25X1

25X1

SPAIN: Local Elections

The municipal elections being held today have evoked scant public interest in light of Prime Minister Suarez' recent victory in the parliamentary election. The parties nevertheless have an important stake in them. The first democratic local elections in Spain in nearly 50 years will permit the parties to establish themselves 25X1 at the grass-roots level.

These elections are genuine contests between Suarez'
Union of the Democratic Center on the right and the Socialists and Communists on the left, and within the left
between the Socialists and the Communists. In several
provinces, the contest is between regional parties and
25X1 national groupings.

Suarez' party is likely to win a majority of the municipal councilorships, mayoralties, and provincial council seats. His party is strongest in the smaller towns, and the electoral law favors his party in these contests. The more consequential races are in the large urban areas, where the left is strongest and where it stands a good chance of securing a foothold.

The Socialists hope to carry the large cities despite their disappointing showing in the national election last month, but in many important contests no party is likely to gain a clear majority. Because the municipal councils elect the mayors and provincial councilmen from their members, there will be considerable maneuvering, particularly between Socialists and Communists. The Socialists have said they would not enter into a coalition with the Communists on the national level, but the two parties are likely to reach some agreements to deny mayoralties and provincial council seats to Suarez' party. This will probably give the Communists a somewhat more important role in some city governments than their 25X1 vote totals would warrant.

In the troubled Basque region, the moderate Basque Nationalist Party, which has recently become more strident in support of autonomy, stands a good chance of beating the national parties. Its large vote, combined with probable gains by Basque radicals, will further complicate the government's task of negotiating an autonomy statute for the region.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

USSR: Industrial Production Languishes

Soviet press reports suggest that the industrial sector's lackluster performance during the last three months of 1978 has continued through the first quarter of this year. Abnormally severe winter weather has been partly responsible for holding down energy production, increasing demand for heating fuels, tying up transportation, and slowing distribution of industrial raw materials and semifinished products. The interruption of Iranian gas deliveries also heightened the strain on energy sup-Oil production fell short of plan at several locations and inadequate supplies of drill pipe and casing impeded drilling operations in Tyumen Oblast. absenteeism in many factories and persistent delays in new factory starts are contributing to the slowdown, particularly in coal and metallurgy.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1							
	Top Secret						
		Approved	For Release 2	2004/07/08 : C	A-RDP79T009	975A03130002	0001-1